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In this paper, we aimed to investigate the role of self-generated predictions in the flexible
control of behavior. Therefore, we ran a task switching experiment in which participants
were asked to try to predict the upcoming task in three conditions varying in switch rate
(30, 50, and 70%). Irrespective of their predictions, the color of the target indicated which
task participants had to perform. In line with previous studies (Mayr, 2006; Monsell and
Mizon, 2006), the switch cost was attenuated as the switch rate increased. Importantly,
a clear task repetition bias was found in all conditions, yet the task repetition prediction
rate dropped from 78 over 66 to 49% with increasing switch probability in the three con-
ditions. Irrespective of condition, the switch cost was strongly reduced in expectation of
a task alternation compared to the cost of an unexpected task alternation following rep-
etition predictions. Hence, our data suggest that the reduction in the switch cost with
increasing switch probability is caused by a diminished expectancy for the task to repeat.
Taken together, this paper highlights the importance of predictions in the flexible control of
behavior, and suggests a crucial role for task repetition expectancy in the context-sensitive
adjusting of task switching performance.
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INTRODUCTION
A hallmark of human cognition lies in the ability to proactively
anticipate relevant future events and steer both action and percep-
tion accordingly. Current influential theories of cognition advance
this proactive prediction generation ability as a central mechanism
of brain functioning, marking a shift away from the view of the
brain passively reacting to incoming stimulation. Predictive repre-
sentations of both visual (e.g., Bar, 2007; Summerfield and Egner,
2009), auditory (Kumar et al., 2011), and olfactory (Zelano et al.,
2011) information have been shown to guide and prepare the
brain for a forthcoming stimulus, aiding information processing
in a noisy and unpredictable environment. By continuously gen-
erating predictions about the environment, the cognitive system is
also able to learn and associate specific actions or stimuli with spe-
cific outcomes. Learning on the basis of these prediction-driven
outcomes is ascribed a central role in optimizing action selection
and response execution in recent modeling work (Alexander and
Brown, 2011; Silvetti et al., 2011). In line with the conception
of the predictive brain, this paper aimed to investigate how self-
generated predictions can flexibly steer attentional control through
advance preparation, by referring to recent empirical work in the
Stroop conflict task (Duthoo et al., submitted) and providing new
evidence from a task switching experiment.
Attentional control is typically studied by means of a conflict
paradigm, such as the Stroop conflict task (see MacLeod, 1991,
for a review). In this task, participants are asked to respond to
the color of a color word while ignoring its meaning. As the color
and word dimension of the stimulus can either overlap or not,
easy (congruent) and difficult (incongruent) stimulus conditions
are created, respectively. Optimal task performance requires adap-
tively adjusting attention to the relevant (color) and irrelevant
(word meaning) dimension. In general, these attentional adjust-
ments can be grouped into two categories based on the underlying
mechanism and the moment in time they are implemented by the
cognitive system (Egner, 2007; Wühr and Kunde, 2008). According
to a reactive control account, adjustments to the control settings
occur in response to the target, corresponding to the metaphor
of the reactive brain. Current models typically assume that it
is the conflict on a given trial that triggers subsequent control
up-regulation, characterized by a strengthening of task-relevant
associations (Botvinick et al., 2001; Verguts and Notebaert, 2008,
2009). This theoretical framework has been successfully applied
to many attentional control phenomena, including the reduc-
tion of the congruency effect following high-conflict incongruent
trials in single-task paradigms (i.e., the Gratton effect; Gratton
et al., 1992; for a review, see Egner, 2007), but also the increase
of the switch cost following high-conflict incongruent stimuli
in dual-task paradigms (Goschke, 2000; Braem et al., submit-
ted). Alternatively, control adjustments can also be triggered in
anticipation of the upcoming task or target, biasing the task or
attentional set proactively. These proactive control adjustments,
captured by the metaphor of the predictive brain described above,
have received considerably less attention in the cognitive control
literature.
In order to investigate this type of expectancy-induced con-
trol, two different strategies have been pursued. On the one hand,
subjects’ expectancies can be manipulated implicitly. Studies on
attentional control have, for example, manipulated the proportion
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of incongruent trials (Logan and Zbrodoff, 1979) or congruency
level transitions (Duthoo and Notebaert, 2012) to induce prepara-
tory strategic control adjustments. Whereas the first manipulation
successfully triggered anticipatory control, reflected in faster reac-
tions to highly expected incongruent trials than to unexpected
congruent trials, the second, more subtle manipulation appeared
not strong enough to elicit expectancy-induced adaptation effects
that were clearly dissociable from reactive, conflict-induced adjust-
ments (see also Jiménez and Méndez, 2012). Alternatively, a more
common and widespread experimental tool to probe anticipa-
tory control adjustments is to cue participants explicitly about the
upcoming stimulus event (for some early experimental work with
the cueing paradigm, see Neill, 1978; Logan and Zbrodoff, 1982;
Harvey, 1984). More recently, Aarts and Roelofs (2011) applied a
probabilistic cueing procedure to a Stroop-like task to point out
that the anticipation of upcoming conflict (or lack of conflict) can
trigger similar sequential adjustments as experienced conflict (or
lack thereof) on the previous trial, both behaviorally and in the
activation pattern of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). In sim-
ilar vein, Correa et al. (2009) found that anticipating conflict in a
cued congruency task sped up both conflict detection and conflict
resolution.
However, investigating proactive control by means of a cue-
ing paradigm is not really testing the implications of a predictive
brain, as it is assumed that we constantly generate predictions
ourselves. Compared to the large amount of studies concerning
cue-induced attentional control, few studies have centered on the
effect of self-generated predictions on subsequent processing. Yet,
human predictive behavior itself has been the focus of much exper-
imental work outside the field of cognitive control. Interestingly,an
influential line of research revealed that people’s predictions and
expectancies are often strongly biased (e.g.,Kahneman et al., 1982),
as they either overestimate or underestimate the actual probability
of events to occur (see also Ayton and Fischer, 2004). When con-
fronted with a random run of stimuli, participants will typically
indicate that longer runs of a particular event have to be balanced
out by the occurrence of the alternative event, a phenomenon
known as the gambler’s fallacy. This tendency for negative recency
is also typically found when people are asked to generate or identify
a random sequence (see Nickerson, 2002, for a review). However,
other studies have shown that people can also display the oppo-
site expectancy bias, the tendency to predict positive recency. A
study of Kareev (1995), for example, in which participants were
asked to predict the next item on the list, revealed that subjects
typically overestimate repeating events. According to Kareev, this
repetition bias stems from a persistent tendency to perceive or
find patterns and causality in the environment (note, however,
that the same tendency, seen from another perspective, can also
result in probability matching behavior at the outcome level, the
strategy to predict the events in proportion to their probability
of occurrence; see Gaissmaier and Schooler, 2008). Apart from its
impact on simple serial two-choice reaction time tasks (Reming-
ton, 1969; Soetens et al., 1985), the impact of this expectancy bias
on information processing and attentional control remains still
relatively uninvestigated. Given both these persistent prediction
biases and the cognitive system’s inherent prepotency to generate
predictions and evaluate its outcomes, investigating self-generated
expectancies and comparing their impact on subsequent process-
ing to that of exogenously triggered expectancies might reveal new
insights into how the brain implements proactive control.
In a previous study (Duthoo et al., submitted), we undertook
a first attempt to measure these biased predictions explicitly and
verify their influence on cognitive control by subjecting partic-
ipants to a Stroop task and letting them predict the congruency
level of the upcoming Stroop stimulus. Interestingly, after recoding
participants’ predictions (“Do you expect a congruent or incon-
gruent trial?”) relative to the congruency level of the previous trial,
results revealed a clear repetition bias in the prediction pattern:
in line with Kareev (1995), participants expected the congruency
level to repeat from one trial to the next in 65% of all cases, even
though congruency level repetition probability was set at 50%.
Moreover, attentional adjustments (i.e., a Gratton effect) were only
found when they anticipated a congruency level repetition. Par-
ticipants showed both a reduced interference of repeating conflict
trials (by proactively narrowing attention to the stimulus color)
and increased facilitation of repeating non-conflicting trials (by
proactively allowing the word meaning to influence response selec-
tion). In case of an unexpected congruency level alternation, these
preparatory adjustments backfired and longer reaction times were
registered, resembling the results of Aarts and Roelofs (2011) in
a probabilistic cueing experiment. Interestingly, analyses of the
congruency alternation predictions also suggested that in antici-
pation of an alternation, participants seemed to switch to a default
control mode, as no sequential adjustments were found. In sum,
the study revealed a clear bias toward predicting repeating events,
and an optimization of control processes (i.e., a Gratton effect)
in anticipation of such repeating events. Alternation expectancies,
on the other hand, did not induce preparatory control.
Contrary to the literature on conflict control, the contribution
of a preparatory component in task switching research has played
a central role in the theoretical debate (e.g., see Karayanidis et al.,
2010 and Kiesel et al., 2010 for recent overviews), overshadowing
research on the reactive priming effects of the previous task-set on
current task performance. In order to investigate these proactive
adjustments, similar strategies have been implemented, aimed at
inducing expectancies either implicitly or explicitly. As an exam-
ple of the former strategy, fixed (predictable) task sequences (i.e.,
the alternating-runs paradigm; Rogers and Monsell, 1995) have
been introduced to compare predictable task switch trials to pre-
dictable repetition trials. Even though two simple tasks were used
and the task sequence was entirely predictable, this paradigm con-
sistently evoked increased reaction times and higher error rates on
switch compared to repetition trials (i.e., robust switch costs). To
probe the impact of explicit expectancies on these switch costs, the
explicit cueing paradigm (Meiran, 1996) was developed, in which
cues specified the required task in a random run of task repeti-
tions and switches. This cueing paradigm has been extensively used
to evidence preparatory reductions in switch costs (e.g., Meiran,
1996; Koch, 2003), albeit not without its own set of methodologi-
cal pitfalls (see Logan and Bundesen, 2003; but see also De Baene
and Brass, 2011 and Jost et al., submitted).
Whereas a previous single-task study (Duthoo et al., submitted)
suggested that alternation expectancies did not induce preparatory
control adjustments, research on task switching has convincingly
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shown how increasing the preparation interval prior to an antic-
ipated task alternation led to more controlled processing (i.e., a
reduced switch cost). Monsell et al. (2003), for example, reported
performance benefits for predictable compared to unpredictable
task switches, suggesting that participants can strategically con-
trol their task-set readiness in function of their expectation, and,
more precisely, in function of the probability of encountering a
task switch on the upcoming trial. In similar vein, further research
has robustly found a reduced switch cost with increasing switch
probability (Mayr, 2006; Monsell and Mizon, 2006; Schneider and
Logan, 2006; Bonnin et al., 2011). Others have pointed out that
not only when expecting a task alternation, but also in antici-
pation of an expected task repetition, task-set readiness can be
adjusted for optimal task performance, resulting in strong repe-
tition benefits (Dreisbach et al., 2002). In sum, more so than in
single-task paradigms, dual-task performance seems to rely on a
strong anticipatory control component.
Even though the theoretical debate about this anticipatory con-
trol component is still ongoing, a key role is usually attributed to
repetition expectancy. For example, the smaller difference between
switch and repeat trials in a context with a 50% compared to a
30% switch probability is sometimes explained by the fact that
participants match their task preparation to the probability of the
switch and repeat conditions, thus equally preparing both tasks
in a 50% switch probability context (Dreisbach et al., 2002; Brass
and von Cramon, 2004; Monsell and Mizon, 2006). Alternatively,
other authors suggested that people prepare the other task on part
of the trials (e.g., Monsell and Mizon, 2006), resulting in extra
preparation and thus longer reaction times on task repetition tri-
als (when their guess was wrong) and less preparation and thus
faster reactions to task switch trials (when their guess was right).
Importantly, both explanations stress the importance of expectan-
cies about the upcoming task. However, as indicated above, past
research has consistently found that people’s predictions are biased
and therefore often do not match the actual probability in a given
context (especially in the context of a random sequence of events;
but see the work of Gaissmaier and Schooler, 2008, showing that
the search for patterns can also result in probability matching at
the outcome level). Moreover, the abovementioned studies never
measured expectancies themselves, so that it remains a question
for further research how expectancies can steer task preparation.
To shed some light on this issue, as well as to compare self-
generated predictions in a dual-task paradigm to previous findings
in a single-task paradigm, we decided to apply a similar proce-
dure as our previous study on prediction-driven adjustments in
the Stroop task (Duthoo et al., submitted). Therefore, we asked
participants to try to predict the upcoming task on a trial-by-
trial basis in one of three between-subjects conditions varying in
switch rate (30, 50, and 70%), and probed both how these con-
texts affected the prediction pattern and how these predictions
themselves influenced the task switch cost. Similar to our previ-
ous findings in the Stroop task, we expected predictions to evoke
advance preparation for the upcoming target. More specifically, we
expected repetition predictions to induce a strong reaction time
benefit when a task repetition was actually presented, and a huge
cost when one had to unexpectedly switch tasks, irrespective of
condition. In contrast with the strong switch costs (and repetition
benefits) following repetition predictions, we expected that alter-
nation predictions evoke less strong preparatory effects (Duthoo
et al., submitted), thereby reducing the switch cost, irrespective of
condition. Consequently, assuming that participants’ tendency to
predict task repetitions is attenuated with increasing switch proba-
bility, we predicted to replicate the finding of a reduced switch cost
in contexts of higher switch probabilities (Mayr, 2006; Monsell and
Mizon, 2006; Schneider and Logan, 2006).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Forty-eight Ghent University students (14 males; age: 17–28)
signed up to participate in one of the three conditions (n= 16)
of the experiment, lasting approximately 45 min. They received
a monetary payment in return. Prior to the testing, participants
provided written informed consent.
STIMULI AND APPARATUS
A program written with T-scope software (Stevens et al., 2006)
controlled the experiment. All stimuli were displayed on a 17-inch
monitor, with a viewing distance of approximately 50 cm. The
numbers 1–9, with the exclusion of 5, served as the target stimuli,
presented in Arial, font size 32. These stimuli were presented cen-
trally on a black background in yellow (for the magnitude task) or
blue (for the parity task). Responses were registered by means of a
QWERTY keyboard.
DESIGN AND PROCEDURE
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three experi-
mental conditions, differing only in the amount of task switches
during the three blocks where an explicit task prediction was reg-
istered. In the repetition condition, the task switch probability was
restricted to 30%. In the intermediate condition, participants were
confronted with an equal amount of task repetitions and alterna-
tions (50%). The alternation condition increased the task switch
probability to 70%.
Throughout all blocks of the experiment, each target num-
ber was equally often presented in blue and yellow, implying that
within each block participants performed an equal amount of
magnitude and parity judgments. Selection of the target number
was pseudo-random,with the restriction that each of the eight pos-
sible number targets appeared an equal amount of times in each
of the two possible colors within one block. In all dual-task blocks,
consisting of 80 trials, each target number was thus presented five
times in both blue and yellow. Participants had to respond by
pressing the E or U keyboard key for small or even target numbers
and the R or I keyboard key for large or odd target numbers. The
mapping of the task (magnitude or parity) to the middle and index
finger of the left hand (keys E and R, respectively) or index and
middle finger of the right hand (keys U and I, respectively) was
counterbalanced across participants. In order to indicate which of
the two tasks they expected, participants had to press the V or N
key with their thumbs. The mapping of these keys to either a mag-
nitude or parity task prediction was compatible with the mapping
of the left or right hand to one of the two tasks.
In all conditions, participants were first trained on each of
the two tasks separately during 40 trials of first magnitude and
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then parity judgments, adding up to 80 single-task practice trials.
Hereafter, the two tasks where combined during two blocks of 80
trials, as to familiarize participants with the dual-task procedure.
For these dual-task training blocks the task switch probability was
kept at 50% in all three conditions. The color in which targets were
presented indicated the task participants had to perform. A yellow
number target asked for a magnitude judgment, whereas a blue tar-
get required a parity response. In the final phase of the experiment,
three blocks of 80 trials were presented during which participants
first had to predict which of the two tasks they expected to come
next. Irrespective of their choices, the color in which the upcom-
ing target was presented again indicated which of the two task
participants had to perform, thereby serving as a feedback sig-
nal for their task predictions. For their performance on the target
numbers no error feedback was provided. A store coupon was
promised to the participant who performed best in the three last
blocks for each condition, taking into account both the amount
of correct predictions and mean reaction times and error per-
centages. In between blocks, participants took a short, self-paced
break. After completing the experiment, participants filled in a
short questionnaire, probing their awareness of the switch prob-
ability manipulation and their use of strategies in predicting the
task sequence.
Each trial started with the presentation of a fixation cross for
500 ms. In the training blocks, this was followed by the target,
which appeared on the screen until a response was registered, with
the maximal reaction time restricted to 2500 ms. Next, the screen
turned black for 500 ms, serving as the inter-trial-interval. In trials
in which participants also had to predict the task on the next trial, a
fixation cross was first presented for 500 ms, after which an instruc-
tion appeared on the screen (“Next trial?”) that remained visible
on the screen until participants clicked one of the two designated
keyboard keys. Hereafter, a fixation cross was again displayed for
500 ms, after which a number target appeared on the screen, with
identical timing values as described above.
RESULTS
In the results section, we focus on the three experimental blocks
in which predictions were also registered. Two participants who
did not engage in the prediction task (by “predicting” the same
task throughout at least one of the three experimental blocks)
were removed from the analysis, restricting the number of par-
ticipants in the intermediate and alternation condition to 15.
Non-responses and badly recorded data (adding up to 1.6%)
were excluded from both the reaction time and performance error
analysis. We applied the multiple comparison correction method
put forward by Holm (1979) in order to control for the family wise
error rate, adjusting the p-values of the post tests in the reaction
time and error analysis accordingly.
REACTION TIMES AND PREDICTIONS
Before conducting the reaction time analysis, the data were sub-
jected to a trimming procedure. We first excluded the trials on
which participants committed an error (8.1% of the remaining
data; distributed equally over the three conditions). Hereafter, the
first trial of each block and RT outliers (±2.5 SD, calculated sep-
arately per condition, subject, and task) were removed (another
3.9%). Taken together, the analysis was thus carried out on 86.9%
of the complete data.
First, a mixed-design analysis of variance with the between-
subjects variable Condition (three levels: repetition, intermediate,
and alternation) and the within-subjects variables Task (two lev-
els: magnitude and parity) and Sequence (two levels: repetition
and alternation) was carried out. Results revealed main effects of
Task,F(1, 43)= 57.36,p< 0.0001, reflecting faster magnitude than
parity judgments (757 and 877 ms, respectively) and Sequence,
F(1, 43)= 116.95, p< 0.0001, indicating the presence of a switch
cost of 106 ms, but not a main effect of Condition, F(2, 43)< 1,
ns. The two-way interaction between Task and Sequence turned
out significant as well, F(1, 43)= 5.47, p< 0.05, reflecting a larger
switch cost for the parity task compared to the magnitude task (120
and 93 ms, respectively), irrespective of Condition, F(2, 43)< 1,
ns. Most importantly, the analysis revealed a two-way interaction
between Sequence and Condition, F(2, 43)= 11.05, p< 0.0001,
implying that the size of the switch cost was significantly affected
by the transitional manipulation. Further independent-samples
t -tests showed that, compared to the switch cost of 112 ms in the
intermediate condition, the switch cost was significantly reduced
to 52 ms by increasing the switch probability in the alternation
condition, t (28)= 3.5, p< 0.01. Decreasing the switch probabil-
ity to 30% in the repetition condition significantly increased the
switch cost to 166 ms compared to the alternation condition,
t (29)= 4.5, p< 0.0001. The increase in switch cost of 54 ms in
the repetition compared to the intermediate condition was only
marginally significant, t (29)= 2.0, p= 0.056. These differences in
the switch cost over conditions are depicted in Figure 1.
Next, we took a deeper look into participants’ task predic-
tion patterns. Irrespective of condition, participants predicted the
magnitude and parity task equally often (i.e., 50%, on average,
FIGURE 1 | Mean reaction times (RTs, in milliseconds) and error
percentages for task repetitions (full line) and task alternations
(dashed line) in the three conditions varying in switch probability. Error
bars represent 95% confidence intervals around the mean.
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SD= 5.4%). These task predictions were then recoded into repeti-
tion or alternation predictions, relative to the task presented on the
previous trial. In line with our manipulation of task switch proba-
bility, participants in the repetition condition predicted more task
repetitions (78%), both compared to participants in the interme-
diate [66%, independent-samples t (29)= 3.1, p< 0.001] and par-
ticipants in the alternation condition [51%, independent-samples
t (29)= 7.63, p< 0.0001]. Remarkably, in all three conditions a
task repetition bias was found, as comparisons between the task
switch prediction rate and the actual task switch probability indi-
cated that both in the intermediate condition [66% compared to
50%, t (14)= 6.77, p< 0.0001], repetition condition [78% com-
pared to 70%, t (15)= 2.86, p< 0.05] and alternation condition
[51% compared to 30%, t (14)= 8.39, p< 0.0001] the amount of
task repetitions was consistently overpredicted.
Finally, we examined the effect of these task predictions on
task performance, by investigating how repetition and alternation
expectations impacted the switch cost. To this end, we ran a mixed-
design analysis of variance with the between-subject variable Con-
dition (three levels: repetition, intermediate, and alternation) and
the within-subjects variables Prediction and Sequence (two lev-
els: repetition and alternation)1. Apart from the main effect of
Sequence,F(1, 43)= 59.89,p< 0.0001, reflecting a switch cost, the
analysis also revealed a marginally significant main effect of Pre-
diction, F(1, 43)= 3.87, p= 0.056, indicating that number targets
were responded to 17 ms slower following alternation predictions
than following repetition predictions. Importantly, a significant
interaction between Prediction and Sequence was also found, F(1,
43)= 88.75, p< 0.0001. The three-way interaction with Condi-
tion did not reach significance, F(2, 43)< 1, ns, suggesting that
participants’ predictions influenced the switch cost similarly in all
three conditions. Following an alternation prediction, the switch
cost, calculated as the difference between an expected task alterna-
tion and an unexpected task repetition, disappeared completely.
Even though inspection of the reaction times suggested a switch
benefit numerically (24, 31, and 32 ms in the repetition, interme-
diate, and alternation condition, respectively), post tests indicated
that this difference did not reach statistical significance in any of
the conditions (all ps> 0.62). Following a repetition prediction, a
huge and significant repetition benefit, calculated as the difference
between an unexpected task alternation and an expected task rep-
etition, was found in all conditions (222, 116, and 147 ms in the
repetition, intermediate, and alternation condition, respectively;
all ps< 0.0001). This pattern of reaction times is visualized in
Figure 2.
ERROR RATES
First, we ran a repeated-measures ANOVA with the between-
subjects variable Condition (three levels: repetition, intermediate,
1We did not include the variable Task in this analysis, as this would cause some of
the cells of the ANOVA to be calculated on a very limited amount of observations
(for instance: a switch to the parity task following an alternation prediction in the
repetition condition). We therefore collapsed observations over the two tasks. Still,
running the analysis with the Task variable included did not change the pattern of
the results. Importantly, the Task variable did not interact significantly with any of
the other variables (all ps> 0.14).
and alternation) and the within-subjects variables Task (two levels:
magnitude and parity) and Sequence (two levels: repetition and
alternation) on the aggregated error scores. Similarly to the reac-
tion time analysis, we found main effects of Task, F(1, 43)= 36.61,
p< 0.0001, reflecting worse performance on parity than magni-
tude judgments (12 and 4.6%, respectively) and Sequence, F(1,
43)= 9.51, p< 0.01, indicating higher error rates on task alter-
nations than on task repetitions (9.2 and 7.4%, respectively),
but no main effect of Condition, F(2, 43)< 1, ns. The two-way
interaction between Task and Sequence also reached significance,
F(1, 43)= 5.07, p< 0.05, indicating that switching to a parity
task (compared to repeating this task) increased the error rate
(3.2%), whereas switching to a magnitude task did not. Most
importantly, we again found a significant interaction between
Sequence and Condition, F(2, 43)= 3.22, p< 0.05, indicating that
the size of the error switch cost differed significantly between
the three conditions, irrespective of task, F(2, 43)< 1, ns. Fur-
ther independent-samples t -tests revealed that this interaction was
brought about by a significant increase in the error switch cost
(3.7%) in the repetition condition compared to the intermediate
condition, t (29)= 2.09,p< 0.05, whereas the error switch cost was
not statistically lower in the alternation condition compared to the
intermediate condition, t (28)< 1, ns. The error rates for task rep-
etitions and task alternations in each of the three conditions are
visualized in Figure 1.
In order to investigate how participants’ predictions had an
impact on the error rates, we conducted another repeated-
measures ANOVA with the between-subjects variable Condition
(three levels: intermediate, repetition, and alternation) and the
within-subjects variables Prediction and Sequence (two levels: rep-
etition and alternation). This analysis revealed only a main effect
of Prediction, F(1, 43)= 5.73, p< 0.05, indicating that an alterna-
tion prediction produced more erroneous responses compared to
a repetition prediction (9.6 and 7.8%, respectively). The two-way
interaction between Prediction and Sequence was only margin-
ally significant, F(1, 43)= 3.3, p= 0.076. The data pattern closely
resembled the reaction pattern, showing a trend for the error
switch cost to be absent following alternation predictions, and
present following repetition predictions. Again, this pattern did
not differ significantly between the three conditions, F(2, 43)< 1,
ns. The error rates for task repetitions and task alternations fol-
lowing repetition and alternation predictions in each of the three
conditions are presented in Figure 2.
DISCUSSION
In the present study, we aimed to investigate how self-generated
predictions influence conflict and task control, expanding previ-
ous research on expectancy-induced proactive control. To do so,
we inserted explicit task predictions into a task switching proce-
dure, thereby complementing as well as elaborating on a previous
experiment in which the influence of congruency level predictions
on subsequent Stroop performance was put to the test (Duthoo
et al., submitted). Results revealed three interesting findings.
Firstly, analysis of participants’ prediction patterns exposed a
bias toward predicting task repetitions in all three conditions. In
the intermediate condition, in which the two tasks alternated in
50% of all transitions, participants displayed a clear task repetition
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FIGURE 2 | Mean reaction times (RTs, in milliseconds) and error
percentages for task repetitions (full line) and task alternations (dashed
line) following repetition and alternation predictions, separately for the
three conditions varying in switch probability. Under each of the graphs,
the corresponding overall percentage of alternation predictions is presented.
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals around the mean.
bias (66%). Also in the alternation condition, participants still
predicted a task repetition in 51% of all transitions, when only
30% were actually presented. Moreover, reaction times and error
rates showed that irrespective of condition, reactions following
a task alternation prediction were slower and more error-prone.
At first sight, this tendency to predict repeating stimulus events,
or “hot hand fallacy,” might seem at odds with the literature on
probability matching (Gaissmaier and Schooler, 2008), revealing
participants’ tendency to match their choice behavior to the actual
probability of two stimuli that are not equally likely to be pre-
sented. Yet, given that participants in the current experiment were
asked to predict the upcoming task rather than the task transi-
tion, participants matched probabilities quite well, as irrespective
of condition the two tasks were predicted equally often (i.e., 50%).
Still, further insight into the transitional probabilities could help
them predicting the upcoming task more accurately. Yet, these
transitional probabilities were less readily picked up, since the
experiment revealed a clear bias toward expecting repetitions.
Interestingly, participants’prediction error rate only dropped from
50 to 38% in the repetition condition [t (15)= 8.9, p< 0.0001], in
which transitional probability was in line with their repetition
expectancy bias.
Secondly, our manipulation of switch probability affected the
switch cost as predicted: compared to the switch cost in the inter-
mediate condition with a 50% switch probability, increasing this
switch probability decreased the switch cost significantly, whereas
decreasing the switch probability strongly amplified the switch
cost. Put differently, the switch cost is attenuated under conditions
of high switch probability, replicating previous studies (Mayr,
2006; Monsell and Mizon, 2006; Schneider and Logan, 2006; Bon-
nin et al., 2011). Moreover, results also revealed that switching to
the parity task came at a greater cost than switching to the mag-
nitude task, both in reaction time and accuracy. This corresponds
well with previous research on asymmetries in switch costs show-
ing that separating the response set of the two tasks results in
greater costs in switching to the more difficult task (Yeung and
Monsell, 2003). In the current experiment, response set overlap
was reduced in terms of response decisions (parity versus magni-
tude judgments) and stimulus-response mapping (both tasks were
mapped to separate hands). Most importantly, this task asymme-
try did not interact with predictions, which formed the main focus
of this study.
Thirdly, by inserting explicit predictions into the dual-task
procedure, we were able to identify a potential mechanism under-
lying the finding of reduced switch costs in conditions with high
switch probability. In all three conditions, the same prediction-
driven behavioral adjustments were found: following an alter-
nation prediction, the difference between repetition and switch
trials disappeared, whereas repetition predictions were followed
by a large switch cost (or a large repetition benefit). Participants
in the alternation condition expected more alternations, thereby
reducing the switch cost significantly. In other words, the reduc-
tion in switch cost in a context of high switch probability might
stem from proactively switching to a more controlled processing
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strategy when expecting task alternations. However, preparing for
a task alternation still comes at a cost, as comparisons between
correctly predicted task repetitions and alternations revealed a sig-
nificant residual task switch cost (all ps< 0.001). This finding is
in line with studies using the explicit cueing paradigm that con-
sistently show that even validly cued task alternations robustly
slowed down responses compared to validly cued task repetitions
(Meiran, 1996).
On an important note, part of the speed-up in reaction time
following correct predictions might reflect an effect of hand prim-
ing, as in the current design correct predictions involved the finger
of the same hand needed for subsequent task execution, whereas
incorrect predictions entailed a switch of hand (e.g., Cooper and
Marí-Beffa, 2008). Still, this definitely cannot account for the
whole pattern of findings, since predicting the other task relative
to the task on the previous trials correctly (i.e., a task alternation
in which the same hand was used for predicting and responding to
the target) did not produce reactions that were significantly faster
than following incorrect task alternation predictions, in which the
task repeated but the hand used for predictions differed from the
hand used for responding to the target. Taken together, this study
suggests that in a dual-task environment, participants expect the
task to repeat, leading to improved performance when it does and
a large cost when it alternates. Still, in anticipation of a task alter-
nation, participants respond equally fast to a task alternation as
to a task repetition. These conclusions are clearly in line with a
proactive, expectancy-based account of task switching.
Moreover, the current findings allow drawing interesting par-
allels between this experiment and the aforementioned previ-
ous Stroop experiment, both in the patterns of self-generated
expectancies as in their effect on subsequent processing. Com-
pellingly, we found a robust bias toward overpredicting repeating
events that was also present in congruency level predictions in the
Stroop task. This bias toward expecting task repetitions coincided
with a clear processing benefit for these repetition predictions,
as alternation predictions typically induced higher errors rates
and increased reaction times, irrespective of condition. Interest-
ingly, the observation of reaction time benefits following repetition
expectations but not after alternation expectations also bears a
striking resemblance to findings within the voluntary task switch-
ing paradigm (Arrington and Logan, 2004). In this paradigm,
participants can choose which task to perform on a series of biva-
lent stimuli, with the instruction to perform both tasks equally
often. In line with the inherent bias toward repetitions defended in
this paper, Arrington and Logan found that the subjects produced
more task repetitions (i.e., 68%) than expected if the tasks were
performed in a pure random sequence. Moreover, deliberately
choosing to switch tasks slowed down task performance signifi-
cantly (i.e., a significant switch cost was found). Taken together, the
experiment revealed that participants displayed a clear reluctance
to switch tasks.
Similar to the voluntary task repetition and switch decisions,
repetition and alternation predictions clearly produced a differen-
tial effect on subsequent processing: repetition predictions were
followed by a strong reaction time benefit when an actual task
repetition was presented, and a large cost when one then had
to (unexpectedly) switch. Again, this pattern closely resembled
findings in our previous Stroop study (Duthoo et al., submitted),
where a clear congruency level repetition benefit and congruency
level alternation cost were found following repetition predictions.
Yet, whereas congruency level alternation predictions were not
followed by behavioral adaptations in the Stroop task, the current
experiment showed that following task alternation predictions the
difference between an actually presented task alternation and an
unexpected task repetition disappeared.
Crucially, this pattern of results did not differ between the three
conditions varying in switch probability. Therefore, the present
experiment suggests an explanation for the often replicated finding
of reduced switch costs in conditions with a higher switch proba-
bility (Mayr,2006; Monsell and Mizon,2006; Schneider and Logan,
2006): increasing the switch probability increases the expectancy
for task alternations, which was found to be followed by a reduc-
tion in the switch cost. However, the interpretation of this reduced
switch cost in anticipation of a task alternation is still open to
debate.
One possible explanation, as was also put forward by Monsell
and Mizon (2006), is that participants adopt a “neutral control
state,” right in between the two task-sets. When the color of the
target then indicated which of the two task-sets was appropriate,
reactions to either one of the two tasks would be equally fast.
This is exactly the pattern of results we found following alterna-
tion predictions, and it emerged in all three conditions. Moreover,
this corresponds well with the absence of sequential modulations
of the Stroop effect following congruency level alternation predic-
tions, which was also explained by participants adopting a“neutral
control mode” (Duthoo et al., submitted).
Alternatively, one can assume that both repetition and alter-
nation predictions lead to advance preparation of the upcoming
task, yet preparation for task alternations is never complete (i.e.,
there is a residual switch cost, e.g., Meiran et al., 2000). Also in our
experiment, correctly predicted task alternations were responded
to much slower than correctly predicted task repetitions, irrespec-
tive of condition. In case of a correctly predicted task alternation,
advance preparation speeds up responding compared to an unex-
pected task alternation (i.e., following a task repetition prediction).
Yet, because of a residual switch cost, these reactions are not sig-
nificantly faster than those to unexpected task repetitions (i.e.,
following a task alternation prediction), where preparation mis-
fires, but no residual switch cost affects performance. The same
logic holds if one assumes the difference between switch and
repeat trials to arise from adaptation to the task-set on repe-
tition trials, reflected in a repetition benefit, rather than from
reconfiguration of the task-set on switch trials, reflected in a
(residual) switch cost (De Baene et al., 2012). In the case of an
unexpected task repetition following a task alternation predic-
tion, reaction times will be relatively slower than for expected
task repetitions, yet equally fast to an expected task alternation,
where no task-set adaptation benefit was present. However, the
current data do not allow differentiating between the adaptation
and reconfiguration view, as both predict the same data pattern:
following correct repetition predictions, both preparation and
task-set adaptation (or lack of reconfiguration) will speed-up an
actual task repetition, whereas following correct alternation pre-
dictions, preparation, and the lack of task-set adaptation (or need
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for reconfiguration) have effects in opposite directions, explain-
ing the intermediate reaction times. Whether this explanation in
terms of equal preparation for switch and repeat trials following
both types of predictions is to be favored over an explanation in
terms of a lack of specific preparation for alternation predictions
(i.e., a neutral control mode) is an interesting question for future
research.
Yet, the current experiment applied a 1:1 mapping between the
cue (i.e., the color of the target) and the task (i.e., a magnitude or
parity judgment), so that task repetitions were confounded with
repetitions of the cue. Therefore, this design does not allow teasing
apart the facilitatory effect of repeated-cue-encoding in task repe-
titions from the effect of executive control processes reconfiguring
the cognitive system in task alternations. In order to disentan-
gle cue repetitions from task repetitions, some previous studies
have introduced multiple cues per task (e.g., Logan and Bunde-
sen, 2003; Mayr and Kliegl, 2003; see Schneider and Logan, 2011,
for a comparison between 1:1 and 2:1 cue-to-task mappings). This
approach has led to a rich body of empirical evidence showing that
repetition priming of cue encoding is indeed an important com-
ponent of task switching. Note, however, that these studies have
also demonstrated that there are usually also substantial“true”task
switch costs remaining (for a review of this evidence, see Jost et al.,
submitted).
Important in the light of the current results is a study of Schnei-
der and Logan (2006), in which this 2:1 cue-to-task mapping was
combined with a transitional probability manipulation similar to
ours. In line with the current findings, switch costs were smallest
in the condition with a high switch probability and largest when
the amount of task repetitions was increased. Modeling of their
data led these authors to conclude that the difference in the switch
costs between different frequency conditions reflected (automatic
or strategic) priming of cue encoding for the frequent transi-
tions. Therefore, an interesting avenue for future research lies in
combining a 2:1 mapping strategy with our prediction manipu-
lation to elucidate whether the prediction-driven adjustments in
task switching performance reported in this paper were driven by
facilitating the speed of cue encoding rather than by promoting
advance configuration of task-set.
Given the emphasis recent theories place on prediction-driven
adjustments in brain functioning, the paradigm to assess self-
generated predictions and probe their impact presented in the
current article seems a particularly promising tool for further
research. Applying this method, we were able to pinpoint struc-
tural biases in human predictions and measure their influence
on subsequent processing in a direct way, rather than inferring
explanations in terms of expectancy indirectly from the data. Yet,
one outstanding question remains whether participants will make
similar predictions when they are not explicitly asked to generate
them, and, consequently, to what extent these expectancy-driven
attentional adjustments can also be found in “normal” Stroop or
dual-task behavior.
In conclusion, the research presented in this paper advocated
viewing the brain as a predictive rather than a purely reactive
device. In this light, the overestimation of repeating events (also
referred to as“the hot hand fallacy”) should not necessarily be con-
sidered as a weakness of our predictive brain. In real life, there is a
much stronger correlation between sequential events than in our
artificial lab tasks. For instance, when the road is slippery because
of wet conditions in one turn, it is usually a good idea to predict
that also the next turn will be slippery and adjust accordingly. It
therefore appears adaptive that the cognitive system is more readily
optimized in anticipation of a repeating event. This is reflected in a
strong repetition benefit for both congruency level and task repeti-
tions. Yet, when interpreting the lack of conflict adaptation and the
reduced difference between task repetition and alternations fol-
lowing alternation predictions in terms of participants adopting a
neutral control mode, it remains an extremely interesting question
to what extent our brain can also prepare for expected changes.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The research reported in this article was supported by grant
no. 3F009109 and FWO10/PDO/234 of the Research Foundation
Flanders (FWO).
REFERENCES
Aarts, E., and Roelofs, A. (2011). Atten-
tional control in anterior cingulate
cortex based on probabilistic cueing.
J. Cogn. Neurosci. 23, 716–727.
Alexander, W. H., and Brown, J. W.
(2011). Medial prefrontal cortex as
an action-outcome predictor. Nat.
Neurosci. 14, 1338–1344.
Arrington, C. M., and Logan, G. D.
(2004). The cost of a voluntary task
switch. Psychol. Sci. 15, 610–615.
Ayton, P., and Fischer, I. (2004). The
hot hand fallacy and the gam-
bler’s fallacy: two faces of subjec-
tive randomness? Mem. Cognit. 32,
1369–1378.
Bar, M. (2007). The proactive brain:
using analogies and associations to
generate predictions. Trends Cogn.
Sci. (Regul. Ed.) 11, 280–289.
Bonnin, C. A., Gaonac’h, D., and Bou-
quet, C. A. (2011). Adjustments
of task-set control processes: effect
of task switch frequency on task-
mixing and task-switching costs. J.
Cogn. Psychol. 23, 985–997.
Botvinick, M. M., Braver, T. S., Barch,
D. M., Carter, C. S., and Cohen, J.
D. (2001). Conflict monitoring and
cognitive control. Psychol. Rev. 108,
624–652.
Brass,M.,and von Cramon,D.Y. (2004).
Decomposing components of task
preparation with functional mag-
netic resonance imaging. J. Cogn.
Neurosci. 16, 609–620.
Cooper, S., and Marí-Beffa, P. (2008).
The role of response repetition
in task switching. J. Exp. Psy-
chol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 34,
1198–1211.
Correa, Á., Rao, A., and Nobre, A. C.
(2009). Anticipating conflict facil-
itates controlled stimulus–response
selection. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 21,
1461–1472.
De Baene, W., and Brass, M. (2011).
Cue-switch effects do not rely on the
same neural systems as task-switch
effects. Cogn. Affect. Behav. Neurosci.
11, 600–607.
De Baene, W., Kühn, S., and Brass,
M. (2012). Challenging a decade
of brain research on task switch-
ing: brain activation in the task-
switching paradigm reflects adap-
tation rather than reconfiguration
of task sets. Hum. Brain Mapp. 33,
639–651.
Dreisbach, G., Haider, H., and Kluwe,
R. H. (2002). Preparatory processes
in the task-switching paradigm:
evidence from the use of probabil-
ity cues. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem.
Cogn. 28, 468–483.
Duthoo, W., and Notebaert, W. (2012).
Conflict adaptation: it is not what
you expect. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. doi:
10.1080/17470218.2012.676655.
[Epub ahead of print].
Egner, T. (2007). Congruency effects
and cognitive control. Cogn. Affect.
Behav. Neurosci. 7, 380–390.
Gaissmaier, W., and Schooler, L. J.
(2008). The smart potential behind
probability matching.Cognition 109,
416–422.
Goschke, T. (2000). “Intentional recon-
figuration and involuntary persis-
tence in task set switching,” in Con-
trol of Cognitive Processes XVIII, eds
S. Monsell and J. Driver (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press), 331–355.
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition August 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 282 | 8
Duthoo et al. Prediction-driven control adjustments in task switching
Gratton, G., Coles, M. G., and Donchin,
E. (1992). Optimizing the use of
information: strategic control of
activation of responses. J. Exp. Psy-
chol. Gen. 121, 480–506.
Harvey, N. (1984). The Stroop effect:
failure to focus attention or failure to
maintain focusing?Q. J. Exp. Psychol.
Hum. Exp. Psychol. 36, 89–115.
Holm, S. (1979). A simple sequentially
rejective multiple test procedure.
Scand. J. Stat. 6, 65–70.
Jiménez, L., and Méndez, A. (2012).
It is not what you expect: disso-
ciating conflict adaptation from
expectancies in a Stroop task. J.
Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform.
doi:10.1080/17470218.2012.676655.
[Epub ahead of print].
Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., and Tversky,
A. (1982). Judgement Under Uncer-
tainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Karayanidis, F., Jamadar, S., Ruge, H.,
Phillips, N., Heathcote, A., and
Forstmann, B. U. (2010). Advance
preparation in task-switching: con-
verging evidence from behavioral,
brain activation, and model-based
approaches. Front. Psychol. 1:25.
doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2010.00025
Kareev, Y. (1995). Positive bias in the
perception of covariation. Psychol.
Rev. 102, 490–502.
Kiesel, A., Steinhauser, M., Wendt, M.,
Falkenstein, M., Jost, K., Philipp,
A. M., and Koch, I. (2010). Con-
trol and interference in task switch-
ing – a review. Psychol. Bull. 136,
849–874.
Koch, I. (2003). The role of external
cues for endogenous advance recon-
figuration in task switching.Psychon.
Bull. Rev. 10, 488–492.
Kumar, S., Sedley, W., Nourski, K. V.,
Kawasaki, H., Oya, H., Patterson, R.
D., Howard, M. A., Friston, K. J.,
and Griffiths, T. D. (2011). Predictive
coding and pitch processing in the
auditory cortex. J. Cogn. Neurosci.
23, 3084–3094.
Logan, G. D., and Bundesen, C. (2003).
Clever homunculus: is there an
endogenous act of control in the
explicit task-cuing procedure? J. Exp.
Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 29,
575–599.
Logan, G. D., and Zbrodoff, N. J. (1979).
When it helps to be misled: facili-
tative effects of increasing the fre-
quency of conflicting stimuli in a
Stroop-like task. Mem. Cognit. 7,
166–174.
Logan, G. D., and Zbrodoff, N. J. (1982).
Constraints on strategy construction
in a speeded discrimination task. J.
Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform.
8, 502–520.
MacLeod, C. M. (1991). Half a century
of research on the Stroop effect: an
integrative review. Psychol. Bull. 109,
163–203.
Mayr, U. (2006). What matters in
the cued task-switching paradigm:
tasks or cues? Psychon. Bull. Rev. 5,
794–799.
Mayr, U., and Kliegl, R. (2003). Differ-
ential effects of cue changes and task
changes on task-set selection costs. J.
Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 29,
362–372.
Meiran, N. (1996). Reconfiguration of
processing mode prior to task per-
formance. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn.
Mem. Cogn. 22, 1423–1442.
Meiran, N., Chorev, Z., and Sapir,
A. (2000). Component processes in
task switching. Cogn. Psychol. 41,
211–253.
Monsell, S., and Mizon, G. A. (2006).
Can the task-cuing paradigm mea-
sure an endogenous task-set recon-
figuration process? J. Exp. Psy-
chol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 32,
493–516.
Monsell, S., Sumner, P., and Waters,
H. (2003). Task-set reconfiguration
with predictable and unpredictable
task switches. Mem. Cognit. 31,
327–342.
Neill,W. T. (1978). Decision processes in
selective attention: response priming
in the Stroop color-word task. Per-
cept. Psychophys. 23, 80–84.
Nickerson, R. S. (2002). The produc-
tion and perception of randomness.
Psychol. Rev. 109, 330–357.
Remington, R. J. (1969). Analysis of
sequential effects in choice reac-
tion times. J. Exp. Psychol. 82,
250–257.
Rogers, R. D., and Monsell, S. (1995).
Costs of a predictable switch
between simple cognitive tasks. J.
Exp. Psychol. Gen. 124, 207–231.
Schneider, D. W., and Logan, G.
D. (2006). Priming cue encod-
ing by manipulating transition fre-
quency in explicitly cued task
switching. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 13,
145–151.
Schneider, D. W., and Logan, G. D.
(2011). Task-switching performance
with 1:1 and 2:1 cue-task mappings:
not so different after all. J. Exp. Psy-
chol. Learn.Mem.Cogn. 37, 405–415.
Silvetti, M., Seurinck, R., and Verguts, T.
(2011). Value and prediction error
in medial frontal cortex: integrating
the single-unit and systems levels of
analysis. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 5:75.
doi:10.3389/fnhum.2011.00075
Soetens, E., Boer, L. C., and Hueting, J.
E. (1985). Expectancy or automatic
facilitation? Separating sequential
effects in two-choice reaction time.
J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Per-
form.11, 598–616.
Stevens, M., Lammertyn, J.,Verbruggen,
F., and Vandierendonk, A. (2006).
Tscope: A C library for program-
ming cognitive experiments on the
MS Windows platform. Behav. Res.
Methods 38, 280–286.
Summerfield, C., and Egner, T. (2009).
Expectation (and attention) in visual
cognition. Trends Cogn. Sci. (Regul.
Ed.) 13, 403–409.
Verguts, T., and Notebaert, W. (2008).
Hebbian learning of cognitive con-
trol: dealing with specific and non-
specific adaptation. Psychol. Rev.
115, 518–525.
Verguts, T., and Notebaert, W. (2009).
Adaptation by binding: a learn-
ing account of cognitive control.
Trends Cogn. Sci. (Regul. Ed.) 13,
252–257.
Wühr, P., and Kunde, W. (2008).
Precueing spatial S–R correspon-
dence: is there regulation of expected
response conflict? J. Exp. Psy-
chol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 34,
872–883.
Yeung, N., and Monsell, S. (2003).
Switching between tasks of unequal
familiarity: the role of stimulus-
attribute and response-set selection.
J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Per-
form. 29, 455–469.
Zelano, C., Mohanty, A., and Got-
tfried, J. A. (2011). Olfactory pre-
dictive codes and stimulus tem-
plates in piriform cortex. Neuron 72,
178–187.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The
authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any com-
mercial or financial relationships that
could be construed as a potential con-
flict of interest.
Received: 15 June 2012; accepted: 22 July
2012; published online: 08 August 2012.
Citation: Duthoo W, De BaeneW,Wühr
P and Notebaert W (2012) When pre-
dictions take control: the effect of task
predictions on task switching perfor-
mance. Front. Psychology 3:282. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00282
This article was submitted to Frontiers
in Cognition, a specialty of Frontiers in
Psychology.
Copyright © 2012 Duthoo, De Baene,
Wühr and Notebaert . This is an open-
access article distributed under the terms
of the Creative Commons Attribution
License, which permits use, distribution
and reproduction in other forums, pro-
vided the original authors and source
are credited and subject to any copy-
right notices concerning any third-party
graphics etc.
www.frontiersin.org August 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 282 | 9
